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POLICY IN PERIPHERALISING ESTONIA
Abstract . An innovation-driven agenda in regional development policy has emerged in the 
European Union against the backdrop of peripheralisation, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe . Using a discursive analytical framework, the article investigates the ways in which 
peripheralisation is manifested through language, practices and power-rationalities in Estonian 
innovation policy discourse . The analysis is footed on key strategic policy documents and semi-
structured expert interviews. Findings suggest that Estonian innovation policy’s main narrative 
of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ accepts growing disparities on sub-national level in order to 
overcome peripherality at European scale and narrows the range of policy solutions perceived as 
suitable . 
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1. INTRODUCTION
An innovation-driven agenda in regional development policy has emerged in 
the European Union against the backdrop of current processes of regional po-
larisation, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) . Most noticeably, 
EU Cohesion Policy has been adjusted towards competitiveness and innova-
tion goals . It increasingly focuses on innovation in larger centres and metro-
politan areas and emphasises the logic of competitiveness and growth-based 
concentration (Bristow, 2010; Hansen and Winther, 2011) . Recent research 
has shown that policies on European and national level play a role in the 
polarisation of urban and regional systems (Ehrlich et al ., 2012; Lang et al ., 
2015). Estonia, for example, chose to put strong emphasis on innovation in its 
approach to regional development (cf . Bachtler et al ., 2005) . Ascribing par-
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ticular spaces as having ‘central’ or ‘peripheral’ qualities within strategic pol-
icy documents has material consequences, e .g . the concentration of resources, 
and affects the potential for future development of spaces (Beetz, 2008). This 
is accompanied by an increasing quantity and intensity of market-oriented 
and place-based policy elements, the effectiveness of which varies in different 
economic and institutional contexts and tends to have polarising spatial effects 
(Swyngedouw et al ., 2002; Weichhart, 2008) . In this article, innovation-based 
regional policy is defined as a set of measures which aim at promoting so-
cio-economic wellbeing and reducing regional disparities by means of inno-
vation, thereby emphasising the dominant position the innovation agenda has 
acquired in regional policies . 
The article investigates the ways in which peripheralisation is manifested 
through language, practices and power-rationalities in Estonian innovation pol-
icy . Having inherited a set of economic and institutional legacies from state so-
cialism, Estonia has been argued to be particularly strong proponent of neoliber-
al reforms among CEE countries since the 1990s (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007) . 
The article discusses the ways in which Estonian innovation policy has been 
shaped by the continuous (re-)imagination of European, national and region-
al spaces through regional development paradigm of innovation and examines 
the response of Estonian innovation policy to the evolving ideas and objectives 
of innovation-based EU Cohesion Policy . It is argued that Estonian innovation 
policy discourse articulates a new meaning about Estonian space,1 driven by 
the language and ideas of ‘innovation’ and the ‘knowledge-based society’ . It is 
suggested that besides studying innovation policy in CEE in terms of adaptation 
and learning, it also should be approached as an inherently political process in 
which particular understandings of space are selected (i .e . become regarded as 
legitimate and institutionally entrenched), depending how well they fit existing 
discourses (cf . Varró and Faragó, 2016) . 
The article is structured as follows: it starts with a brief overview of ap-
proaches to innovation-based regional development policy in the CEE context. 
Building on this, a discursive analytical framework is employed which views 
policy formulation as a multi-scalar discourse, i .e . as a process in which narra-
tives around the innovation-based rationale of EU Cohesion Policy are appro-
priated or contested by various actors at different scales. The following section 
shortly outlines the contours of current innovation-based EU Cohesion Policy 
and presents the innovation policy context in Estonia. It then proceeds by ap-
plying the analytical framework to Estonian innovation policy and draws some 
conclusions .
1 Spaces are understood as social and discursive products (Lefebvre, 1991), with policies at diffe-
rent levels as agents which perpetually construct and shape these spaces .
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2. LINKING PERIPHERALISATION AND INNOVATION POLICY 
DISCOURSES – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The article takes on a constructivist approach, examining how centrality and pe-
ripherality is constructed through innovation policy discourse . Following Carter 
(2015), peripheralisation is approached from a discursive perspective . Fischer-Ta-
hir and Naumann (2013) define peripheralisation as ‘a spatially organised inequal-
ity of power relations and access to material and symbolic goods that constructs 
and perpetuates the precedence of the centres over areas that are marginalised’ 
(p . 18) . As a relational process, peripheralisation is interlinked with the centrali-
sation of a small number of other spaces, which e .g . attract population and have 
better economic productivity and infrastructural functions (Kühn, 2014) . Com-
bining a discursive analytical framework based on Richardson and Jensen (2003) 
with the foregoing definition, the article seeks to provide a better understanding of 
how peripheries are discursively created through policymaking. Specifically, the 
way in which particular discursive constructions of space relate to the ‘innovation’ 
agenda is discussed here . 
Innovation policy in Estonia and other CEE countries have predominantly 
been researched by political scientists and public administration scholars, e .g . 
with a focus on the institutional capacity to adapt and learn from EU and other 
‘Western’ policies, often from a systemic perspective . Furthermore, the focus 
has mostly been on structural and institutional elements of the innovation sys-
tem . Discursive aspects pointing to the political nature of policy formulation 
have only scarcely been considered . Taking a systemic approach, Kattel and 
Primi (2010) analyse innovation policy in peripheral regions in terms of the 
dynamics of innovation policy and their relationship with structural change and 
economic development . From a more critical perspective, De Bruijn and La-
gendijk (2005) suggest not to overemphasise the role of innovative capabilities 
in the development of regions . Rather, they stress the dependency on and con-
straints of the national context. 
Niinikoski and Kuhlmann (2015) follow a novel approach in that they combine 
a social-constructivist perspective with Foucauldian thinking . They conceptualise 
innovation policy as a discourse and argue that changes in innovation policy are 
the outcome of highly politicised negotiations . The discursive dimension can shed 
light on the question whether innovation policy puts higher value on certain spac-
es and forms of development than others, which for instance is expressed in the 
concentration of resources in particular places to the disadvantage of others (Ehr-
lich et al., 2012). Only to a certain extent, the definition of a policy problem and 
suitable policy solutions follows objective ‘facts’ . Instead, this framing process is 
greatly political and contingent upon power relations between governance levels 
and actors in a particular time and space . 
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The article discusses how peripheralisation is manifested in the language, 
practices and power-rationalities in Estonian innovation policy . The narratives 
of ‘innovation’ construct a particular policy problem, e .g . how non-central re-
gions lack essential features and capacities which are assumed to enable them to 
develop and potentially catch up with the central regions . Negatively connoted 
framings of spaces, e.g. as exhibiting deficiencies, can lead to biased attitudes and 
decisions regarding certain spaces, which can reinforce both discursive and struc-
tural peripherality (Carter, 2015) . The demands an innovation-oriented regional 
development policy makes towards space shape the imaginations of that space, 
such as ascriptions which depict regions as ‘lagging behind’, lacking resources 
and certain features, or the need to tap into ‘unused potential’ . 
3. THE CHANGING FOCUS OF INNOVATION POLICY  
AT VARIOUS SCALES
3.1. EU Innovation Policy in the Context of the Lisbon Strategy
The Lisbon Strategy constituted a shift in the evolution of EU innovation policy, 
as it changed the policy context markedly. It put innovation into the centre of 
policy aspirations as the driver for growth and brought about fundamental chang-
es in terms of policy integration . EU Cohesion Policy and its programmes such 
as INTERREG started to allocate larger budget shares to innovation (European 
Commission, 2007) . Regional policies and industrial policies were increasingly 
merged by means of ‘place-based’ cluster approaches (Barca, 2009) . Also, re-
search policy was linked with ‘place-based’ innovation approaches . These chang-
es further interconnected regional policy, industrial policy and research policy 
to pursue the Lisbon agenda’s main goal of fostering the EU’s competitiveness 
and cohesion . As a result, EU innovation policy has evolved from an initial co-
existence of small, local projects in the 1980s and 1990s to a broad multi-level 
and multi-sector policy, which has become increasingly mainstreamed into EU 
Cohesion Policy . Also, the shift of innovation policies towards the regional level, 
and funded by Structural Funds, has brought spatial questions more into the focus . 
The share of EU Cohesion Policy assigned for innovation from the overall budget 
steadily increased from 11% in the 2000–2006 programming period to 25% in 
2007–2013 (85 billion out of 345 billion EUR). Specifically, innovation support in 
terms of R&D infrastructure, entrepreneurship, ICT development and uptake, and 
human capital grew (European Commission, 2015) . Overall, a gradual ‘paradigm 
change’ took place in EU Cohesion Policy which shifted the focus away from the 
support for investment and employment in less favoured regions towards human 
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capital and ‘soft’ production factors in order to improve the business environment 
and the capabilities of regions, e .g . by building their institutional infrastructure 
and the level and intensity of networking between actors (Bachtler et al ., 2005) . 
The eastward expansion of the EU then fundamentally changed the context of 
EU innovation policy, as spatial disparities in the EU started to soar up (Bachtler 
and McMaster, 2007) . At the same time, pressures from globalisation processes 
and the economic and financial crisis starting around 2008 have contributed to 
a substantial change in the policy context, such as the erosion of the economic 
status of (mainly Western) Europe in the global economy (Brenner, 2009) . This 
narrowed the perceived room for manoeuvre of policy responses . As a conse-
quence, the European Commission began to put the focus of EU Cohesion Policy 
on providing the framework to promote growth and support innovation through 
the Lisbon Strategy and, more recently, the Europe 2020 strategy .2 The impli-
cations were an increased emphasis on endogenous growth in all regions rather 
than redistribution to less developed areas, thereby pronouncing economic and 
governance issues (Vanolo, 2010; Hadjimichalis, 2011) . Also, the view on space 
in EU policy has transformed from regions to cities and city-regions which are 
considered the main contributors of economic growth and productivity in the con-
text of a globalising economy (Varró and Faragó, 2016). This extensive ‘rescaling’ 
(Brenner, 2009) of competences, resources and responsibilities manifests e .g . in 
the refocusing of regional policies .  
3.2. Innovation Policy in Estonia
The integration of CEE countries into European and global markets was ‘led from 
the outside’ by influential economic, political and financial institutions such as the 
EU, the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, which national political elites in CEE 
willingly accepted (Kattel and Primi, 2010). The required adherence to fiscal and 
monetary discipline limited the array of policy options and furthered a dependen-
cy of Estonia and other CEE countries to supranational actors (Varró and Faragó, 
2016) . A large share of investments came from foreign direct investment and for-
eign-owned banks . Transnational companies (TNCs) tend to import major techno-
logical and organisational innovations and know-how from abroad. Ženka et al . 
(2014) suggest that TNCs tend not to develop a close R&D cooperation with local 
suppliers and universities . Prior to Estonia’s accession to the EU, innovation policy 
at the national level barely existed. Policies inspired by the mentioned suprana-
2 Hadjimichalis (2011) gives an account of the power relations behind the neoliberal turn in EU 
policy discourse, which is reflected in the Lisbon Strategy, and emphasises that particular elites 
and hegemonic blocs, mainly from European ‘core’ countries, took advantage of the economic and 
social-spatial restructuring in Europe during the last decades .  
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tional institutions and the political agenda of national independence linked to rapid 
marketisation marginalised the idea of formulating targeted innovation policies and 
instead aimed at a number of other priorities, which according to Kattel and Primi 
(2010: 24) were the privatisation programmes and other measures to attract for-
eign direct investments; emphasis on macro-economic stability; erosion and partial 
disintegration of the previous Soviet R&D system, and market demand as the key 
force of restructuring and reform of innovation system . Then in the 2000s, the focus 
slowly moved to policies promoting competitiveness and innovation-related goals . 
Estonia has a politically and economically dominant capital region and is, ad-
ministratively, a single NUTS 2 region in the EU context. Its innovation system 
is centralised and innovation policy does not have any regional priorities . De-
velopment policy has taken an approach which gives innovation a high profile, 
while support measures are mostly organised along sectors . Innovation policy is 
the sole competence of the national government and task of the Research and 
Development Council, which apart from ministers includes academicians and 
representatives of the private sector. There are six public universities in Estonia, 
all of which are located in either Tallinn or Tartu . Research policy is regarded as 
generally comprising university-led research, whereas innovation policy address-
es research led by the private sector (Ruttas-Küttim and Stamenov, 2016) . In the 
pre-EU accession period, many policies areas underwent ‘Europeanisation’, i .e . 
objectives and strategies were adopted from EU level and also innovation was 
put on the agenda more prominently . However, the focus on linear innovation in 
combination with a continuously weak administrative system which lacked net-
working and long-term planning skills led to specific problems (Suurna and Kat-
tel, 2010). Kattel and Primi (2010) point to a strong mismatch between R&D and 
education system outcomes and industry needs . Innovation policy in Estonia, like 
in other CEE countries, focuses on high technology, e .g . the commercialisation of 
cutting-edge R&D results, incubators and technology parks. At the same time, the 
overall economic and industrial structure shows a low productivity growth and the 
majority of activities have a very low demand for R&D, i.e. there is a detachment 
between innovation and the industrial structure. Also, in the context of innovation 
policymaking actors such as universities, companies and governmental institu-
tions are fragmented and weakly aligned (Kattel and Primi, 2010, p . 20) . 
4. RESEARCHED MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGY
The paper employs a discursive analytical framework, drawing on the work of 
Richardson and Jensen (2003). The analysis rests on the definition of discourse 
as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is produced, 
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reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995, p . 264) .
This framework can reveal how discourses in EU policy challenge the dis-
courses and practices that have been evolving in the member states . The changing 
discourse in Estonian innovation policy is shaped in a complex setting of contested 
ideas on different levels, in this case between the national and the European level. 
Policymaking is understood as a process embedded in a web of social meanings 
produced through discursive practices in a particular historical and institution-
al context (Fischer, 2003, p. 13). Following the discursive approach, policy dis-
courses can be examined in terms of their reproduction in language and practice 
in order to reveal their underlying power-rationalities (Richardson and Jensen, 
2003) . This allows to analyse ‘the ways in which spaces and places are represent-
ed in policy discourses in order to bring about certain changes of socio-spatial re-
lations and prevent others’ (Richardson and Jensen, 2003, p . 416) . The analysis of 
discourse as representations is divided into three analytical categories: language, 
policy making practices and power-rationalities. This offers a link between textual 
analysis and materialities . 
The following analysis, due to space limits, is based on the EU Cohesion Pol-
icy documents for Estonia in the programming periods 2000–2006, 2007–2013 
and 2014–2020 at NUTS 2 level, and on the main national strategic innovation 
policy document, ‘Knowledge-based Estonia’, for the periods 2002–2006, 2007–
2013 and 2014–2020 . Furthermore, the analysis also rests on 9 semi-structured in-
terviews conducted with policymakers and stakeholders3 were conducted to reveal 
policy making practices and underlying power rationalities .
5. THE MAKING OF CENTRES AND PERIPHERIES IN ESTONIAN 
INNOVATION POLICY
On EU level, and increasingly on national level as well, a plethora of documents 
accompanies the evolution and shifts in innovation policymaking and displays 
emerging and dissipating discourses . Key policy documents are ‘fragments of dif-
ferent knowledge-framing processes’ (Richardson and Jensen, 2003, p . 17) . By 
framing problems and solutions in a particular way, and by ascribing qualities to 
some spaces while not to others, specific demands emerge for ‘(spatial) know-
ledge’ to be gathered and analysed in a particular way . This framing is an inher-
3 The selected interview partners are active professionals in policy making, policy analysis, imple-
mentation of measures for innovation and business support, or work for agencies that deal with EU 
Structural Funds targeted at innovation support and regional development . For this reason, the re-
spondents were able to provide knowledgeable assessments concerning the article’s research focus .
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ently political process, as various ideas and agendas are perpetually promoted and 
contested by involved actors . 
Here, firstly, the language used in Estonian innovation policy discourse to con-
struct the policy problem as well as the proposed solution will be analysed . In 
terms of language on space, special attention is on how particular regions are 
framed in the light of the ‘innovation’ agenda . Secondly, the analysis of policy 
making practices will look at the institutions and decision-making in different 
periods, and at the way in which these create centrality and peripherality through 
the process of preparing the policies. Lastly, the examination of power-rationali-
ties will build upon the analysis of language and practices and explore the overall 
discursive frames used throughout the evolution of Estonian innovation policy . 
Richardson and Jensen (2003) state that these rationalities ‘are implicitly acts of 
power in that they are attempts to govern what sort of social actions are to be car-
ried out and what are not’ (p . 19) – and we should add, in what spaces . 
5.1. Language
The single Operational Programme for the 2004–2006 programming period put the 
focus on human resource development, the competitiveness of enterprises and up-
grading the infrastructure . Innovation-related measures made up 8 .4% of EU Struc-
tural Funds expenditure. During this time, EU Cohesion Policy was not explicitly 
the driving an innovation agenda in Estonia. In contrast to this, the first national 
innovation strategy ‘Knowledge-based Estonia 2002–2006’ (ERDS 1) pronounced 
building an ‘innovation-based economy’ as the main goal . Competitiveness was to 
be achieved through focusing on human capital, effective education and innovation 
systems that support research and development and through integration into inter-
national networks of cultural, research and economic cooperation . Key areas were 
identified to be information technology (ICT), biomedicine and materials’ technol-
ogy . Repeatedly, the small size of Estonia was said to be both a weakness but also 
an opportunity which may prompt policy to focus on only those economic areas 
the country internationally has a comparative advantage4 in (ERDS 1, pp . 5, 6, 8, 
9, 20, 29). Only then Estonia could avoid the risk of becoming ‘an insignificant 
borderland in Europe’ (ERDS 1, p . 5) . Research and development are seen as one 
of the ‘preconditions for the functioning and development of all society’ (p . 6) . The 
strategic objectives the strategy follows are updating the knowledge pool and in-
creasing the competitiveness of enterprises . It is clearly marked that Estonia’s stra-
tegical approach somewhat anticipates the EU’s development priorities and policy 
4 The vocabulary strongly reflects development theories rooted in neoclassical economics, which 
has been very much present in EU Cohesion Policy documents since the Lisbon Strategy was de-
vised in 2000 .
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orientations concerning R&D and innovation. By doing so, it divides the Estonian 
territory (implicitly) on the one hand into innovative centres and on the other hand 
those regions which are ill-equipped for being innovative in the proclaimed key 
economic areas (ICT, biomedicine and materials’ technology) . As argued above, 
the sites of those key sectors are mainly Tallinn and Tartu, which in turn leads to 
the peripheralisation of other Estonian regions .
The trajectory set in ‘Knowledge-based Estonia 2007–2013’ (ERDIS 2) close-
ly follows the initial strategy . By adding the term ‘innovation’ to its subtitle (mak-
ing it the ‘Estonian Research and Development and Innovation Strategy’), the 
strategy’s innovation focus gets more explicit. Objectives are an increased in-
tensity and quality of R&D, enhancing innovation capabilities of enterprises and 
cultivating an innovation-friendly society . The key areas of intervention remain 
ICT, biotechnologies and materials’ technology . Also, the orientation towards the 
EU as a frame of reference is very visible . While in the previous period the logic 
of intervention was characterised by a linear understanding of innovation, the dis-
course shifts towards a systemic approach, advocating public-private partnerships 
and the cooperation between agents in the Estonian innovation system . However, 
according to this view the only places where the networks are dense enough to 
grow are the few well-connected urban regions of Tallinn and Tartu . Also, the 
focus on research and innovation as a means for building and retaining national 
competitiveness is framed to be the only available option to achieve this goal: 
‘[t]here is no alternative to this path’ (ERDIS 2, p . 4) . The strategy applies the 
frame that innovation lies at the core of the knowledge-based model of society, 
which all ‘developed’ countries embody . So in order to consider itself to be part 
of the circle of those ‘developed’ countries, Estonia needs to project the same 
ambitions (ERDIS 2, p . 5) . Furthermore, meeting the goals of the Lisbon Strategy 
takes a central position in the strategy’s reasoning . In terms of the conception of 
spatial issues, polycentrism is argued to be inevitable due to Estonia’s low popula-
tion density (ERDIS 2, p. 26). The strategy identifies the role of county centres in 
strengthening regional innovation potential as being important, but weak . In terms 
of centrality and peripherality, the strategy’s conceptualisation of a region is that 
of a site which has to be made attractive for investments and entrepreneurship . 
However, the priority lies clearly on improving the international competitiveness 
of R&D activities in Tallinn and Tartu, where the majority of R&D potential is 
seen . This is contrary to the idea of polycentricity .5 
In the latest strategy ‘Knowledge-based Estonia 2014–2020’ (ERDIS 3), the 
general orientation has evolved once again . The ‘smart specialisation’ concept has 
assumed the role of the key policy approach towards supporting innovation, there-
by merging ‘Knowledge-based Estonia’ with the EU’s compulsory elaboration of 
a ‘smart specialisation’ strategy . In Estonia, this constitutes innovation policy’s 
5 ‘Polycentricity’ has become a key concept in spatial planning across the EU .
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closer alignment with regional policy, while the innovation focus has already been 
mainstreamed into EU Cohesion Policy in the 2014–2020 programming period . 
One key linguistic element in the 2014–2020 Partnership Agreement is ‘poten-
tial’, which remains ‘untapped’ in many regions (Ministry of Finance, 2014) . 
Throughout the document, structural indicators are put forward to assert an image 
of spatial order which conceives of Tallinn and Tartu as the only centres (along 
with a number of often unspecified regional centres). In terms of innovation, all 
ERDIS editions perceive the EU member states as the frame of reference which 
Estonia (as a whole) has to keep up with . By a way of seeing it, innovation policy 
accepts the peripheralisation of regions at sub-national scale in order to overcome 
Estonia’s peripherality at European scale . The regions outside the well-perform-
ing capital region constitute a problem due to their poor performance and lack of 
capacities . Overall, the notion of spatial cohesion is mostly absent in Estonian in-
novation policy . It accepts the fragmentation at regional level, since the ambition 
is to stay competitive on European and global level . 
5.2. Policy Making Practices
On EU level, innovation policy mainly aims at the regional level . In the NUTS 
classification, the whole of Estonia is considered one NUTS 2 region. From the 
EU’s point of view, a further regionalisation of innovation policy at NUTS 3 level is 
not foreseen . Accordingly, the division of support from Structural Funds in Estonia 
was divided along the set priorities without any actual regional targeting below the 
national level . 45% of the Estonian population lives in rural or predominantly rural 
areas (OECD 2016) . Moreover, being a very open small economy, foreign direct 
investment has a major impact on development in Estonia . These investments tend 
to concentrate on the capital region of Tallinn, where returns are likely to be higher 
(ERDIS 3), yet may have a negative effect on any attempts at fostering spatial cohe-
sion. The trend of polarisation has been further exacerbated since the beginning of 
the financial and economic crisis in 2008 (European Commission, 2016). Structural 
Funds are the key factor for financing innovation and R&D support measures. In 
terms of funding concrete projects, all tenders are competition-based . At the region-
al level, implementation of measures is argued to have been most effective in Tallinn 
and Tartu (and its surrounding counties), due to having the highest absorption capa-
city for ERDF-supported measures (Applica, Ismeri and wiiw, 2006) . 
When looking at the actors involved in the preparation of the national strate-
gies, the exclusion of interests from regions outside of Tallinn is visible. ‘Knowl-
edge-based Estonia 2002–2006’ was prepared by a working group with the par-
ticipation of the Ministry of Education6 (MoE), the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
6 The ministries’ names changed during the analysed periods due to a re-scheduling of responsibilities . 
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(MoEA) and the Estonian Academy of Sciences . There was in fact a public debate 
on the strategy, comprising participants from universities, research and develop-
ment institutions, private companies and topic-related associations, who had the 
opportunity to make proposals for amending the strategy (ERDS 1) . However, 
most issues raised by stakeholders from non-central regions, i .e . Tallinn and Tartu, 
went unnoticed (Interview with Government Official 1). The policymaking proce-
dure was highly centralised, e .g . in terms of prioritising goals, which were mainly 
focused on the national economy . The committee preparing ‘Knowledge-based 
Estonia 2007–2013’ was under the direction of the Ministry of Education and Re-
search . Participants were representative of two other ministries (MoEA and MoF), 
universities from Tallinn and Tartu, business support agencies, and the Bank of 
Estonia. The draft was then sent to approx. 120 stakeholders involved in R&D and 
innovation support, followed by a one-day public debate (ERDIS 2) . Again, the 
contribution of stakeholders, both public and private, had no tangible effect on the 
contents and the implementation of the policy (Interview with Government Offi-
cial 2) . The 2007–2013 strategy does not make any reference to spatial develop-
ment issues . ‘Knowledge-based Estonia 2014–2020’ (ERDIS 3) has been prepared 
with the involvement of the same councils and committees on government level 
as the previous time . Notably, this time a special advisory group of academicians 
called the ‘Research and Innovation Policy Monitoring Programme (TIPS) was 
involved in providing reports and recommendations (ERDIS 3, p . 3; Interview 
with Government Official 2). The selection of ‘growth areas’, as the strategy puts 
it, has been conducted by using the smart specialisation methodology developed 
by the OECD and the European Commission . Overall, the participation of the 
local and regional level in advisory bodies and in the design, implementation and 
assessment of innovation policy is very limited . A few attempts have been made 
at involving the local and regional level in creating strategies for the regional 
level . The Tartu Regional Innovation Strategy aimed at increasing the competi-
tiveness of enterprises in Tartu and Southern Estonia or the Development Strategy 
of Ida-Virumaa 2005–2013, which partly targeted research and innovation . Yet 
these attempts remained scarce and without much impact to inspire similar actions 
(Inzelt, 2006) . 
5.3. Power-rationalities
Concerning innovation-based regional development, EU Cohesion Policy pro-
vides the frame for what constitutes legitimate and effective policy-making in 
Estonia. It defines the policy problems and then provides the rationale for which 
policy solutions are deemed appropriate . Throughout the evolution of Estonian 
innovation policy, it becomes visible that the innovation agenda set by EU Co-
hesion Policy (European Commission 2007; 2015) was first anticipated and later 
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proactively adopted by Estonian policymakers. The EU’s definition of the problem 
which innovation policy is supposed to address as well as the legitimate measures 
concerning how it is to be solved were embraced by Estonian innovation policy . 
Then again, the EU’s co-financing share for Cohesion Policy programmes was 
above 80% in the 2007–2013 programming period, showing Estonia’s strong de-
pendency on EU funding (Interview with Government Official 1). The need to 
adopt policy ideas and conceptualisations from EU level is the consequence of 
ex-ante conditionalities, which make the array of legitimate policy responses rath-
er narrow. Yet at the same time, signs of resistance to externally proposed (if not to 
say imposed) approaches to regional development strategies based on innovation, 
brought forward especially by the EU, the IMF and the OECD, are rather faint . 
If anything, Estonia’s policy approach preceded the idea of innovation-based re-
gional development . So by a way of seeing it, from the mid-2000s EU Cohesion 
Policy’s growing focus on innovation pushed at open doors .7 
Concerning the interplay between the central government and the sub-national 
levels, there is a distinct power imbalance in the competence to formulate policy . 
This applies to setting agendas and deciding on what strategies are deemed appro-
priate . The strategic documents also show that Estonia’s logic of intervention in 
innovation policies stayed consistent, despite the frequently changing government 
coalitions in office during the analysed periods. In the preparation of Estonia’s in-
novation strategies, only ministries, business support bodies and other actors from 
the national level were involved . Local and regional level organisations in Estonia 
are mostly weak and have thus been unable to markedly influence the prevailing 
innovation policy approach . Issues of scale are important here: instead of promot-
ing a balanced regional development within its national space-economy, Estonian 
innovation policy’s strategic approach – developed and practiced in a top-down 
manner by the central governmental bodies – is to position its only city-region of 
Tallinn within European and global circuits of capital accumulation (ERDIS 3, 
several interviews) . 
6. CONCLUSION
The article discussed how a discursive analytical framework can contribute to un-
derstanding recent debates on innovation policy and its spatial implications such as 
peripheralisation on European and sub-national level . In the Estonian case, the nar-
ratives of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘innovation’ construct the particular 
7 After re-gaining independence in 1991, Estonia embraced this idea very strongly as a way to over-
come its peripheral position in global capital flows.
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policy problem, namely how regions outside of Tallinn lack features and capacities 
which are assumed to enable them to develop and potentially catch up with the 
capital region . The EU’s neoliberal market logic and promoting endogenous growth 
within regions is highly visible in the Estonian discourse, which sees the highest 
innovation potential in the centres . The socio-economic inequalities between the 
capital Tallinn and the rest are rarely posed as a policy problem in the strategies . 
Examining the language, practices and power-rationalities in Estonian inno-
vation policy in terms of peripheralisation pointed to two main aspects . First, the 
imagination of central and peripheral regions is such that the latter are framed 
as lacking resources and capacities, having plenty of unused potential and are to 
a certain extent seen as redundant spaces in the light of the dominant narrative 
of the ‘knowledge-based society’. This sets the expected contribution of regions 
outside the capital to the proclaimed goal quite low and further marginalises their 
position in the discourse and therefore on the policy agenda . Second, the involve-
ment of actors representing the interests of regions outside Tallinn in policymak-
ing is very limited . Innovation policy is highly centralised and barely considers 
issues raised by stakeholders outside the capital during the policymaking process .
Furthermore, while pursuing the integration into the European and global eco-
nomic system, i .e . in order to move Estonia as a whole towards the economic 
‘core’, processes of spatial de-coupling at the sub-national level do not receive 
policy attention . Rather, in order to overcome peripherality at European scale, 
Estonia’s powerful agents involved in policymaking accepts peripheralisation at 
sub-national level . In addition, with regard to EU policy, Estonia counts as one 
NUTS 2 region and therefore addresses only the country in its entirety . This masks 
peripheralisation processes at lower levels . The orientation towards a small num-
ber of centres is visible in Estonian innovation policy, and has intensified over 
the examined time period. At the same time, there is a lack of strategies for less 
favoured regions, which do have their advantages, but tend not to be related to the 
dominant high-tech innovation narrative . As the causal processes of peripherali-
sation are multi-faceted, policy discourse and its performative character naturally 
have only a share in explaining them. Further research from a discursive analyti-
cal perspective can bring new insights by comparing discourses in CEE countries, 
looking at the strategies to legitimise (or contest) current innovation-based region-
al policy. Also, a closer examination of the key actors’ practices and entrenched 
power relations are further avenues for research .
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